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Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of both world trade and two thirds of the
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small
and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed
economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality
generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation.
such as the WTO. but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular,
we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it Includes
the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex-post fines. Moreover, a combination
of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial















International trade relations between developed and developing countries have often been ad-
versarial. As early as 1947, some developing countries were denouncing U.S. proposals for the
predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as ￿serving the interests of developed
countries and undermining the development prospects of poor countries￿(Srinivasan, 1999, p.
1050). More recently, the Uruguay Round was seen by most developing countries as having
produced a multilateral bargain that is biased heavily in favor of developed countries. Partly to
rectify the perceived imbalance of the Uruguay Round outcome, the Doha Development Round
was launched in 2001 with the idea that it would put the interests of developing countries at
the forefront.1
Developing countries now account for two thirds of the 153 WTO members (up from 11 in
the GATT) and over a third of world trade and have increasingly begun to demand a more
active voice in multilateral negotiations. However, they still face considerable challenges in
translating such demands into tangible outcomes: despite being over a decade old, the Doha
Round shows no signs of concluding anytime soon. In this paper we analyze a key problem that
developing countries face in trying to achieve a more favorable outcome in international trade
negotiations ￿i.e. the presence of a coordination externality among themselves. Even though
developing countries are now large on aggregate, most are still individually small and thus
have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed
economies. We show that under standard agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade
retaliation ￿such as the WTO ￿this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes
that are less favorable to developing countries (as well as globally) than those obtained under
an agreement extended to include certain types of ￿nancial instruments.
The traditionally dominant role of large countries in the world trading system is partly due
to the bilateral and reciprocal nature of negotiations in international trade agreements such as
the GATT/WTO. The key idea is simple: if the EU wants lower US tari⁄s on its exports then
it must reciprocate with lower tari⁄s on goods it imports from the US. Note, however, that
this reciprocal exchange relies on the presence of relatively symmetric market power on both
1The Doha ministerial declaration of November 2001 states: ￿We recognize the need for all our peoples to
bene￿t from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The
majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of
the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration."
1sides: while a tari⁄ reduction by a country with a su¢ ciently high import share and market
power increases the price received by foreign exporters, no signi￿cant bilateral concessions occur
when the reduction is undertaken by a small country.2 Market power is also key in enforcing
cooperation since the threat to abandon the agreement and increase tari⁄s on the part of a
country that lacks such power is not credible and therefore fails to act as a useful deterrent.
Thus, bilateral asymmetries in market power undermine international cooperation and may
explain why some exports from (smaller) developing countries (e.g. in agriculture, textiles, some
manufactures) have historically faced relatively higher tari⁄s in (larger) developed countries.
By undermining cooperation, this asymmetry can also lead to higher tari⁄s by developing
countries but as long as they remain small as a group, the large countries do not lose much
from this, which may explain why the latter have not pushed developing countries to liberalize
further until recently.3
Most formal analyses of the GATT/WTO focus on two large countries.4 The focus on this
canonical case has yielded important insights and was a reasonable approximation of actual
negotiations at the GATT/WTO since up until the Uruguay Round these negotiations were led
primarily by the US and Europe (c.f. Schott, 2009). However, the global economic landscape
has changed signi￿cantly with the emergence of BRICs ￿Brazil, Russia (which may soon join
the WTO), India and China. From 2000 to 2009 alone the world import share of the largest
traders, the US and EU, fell from 43% to 34% (54% to 42% if we also include Japan and
Canada) and their bilateral trade accounts for less than 20% of their total trade.5 The relative
decline of the US and EU in world trade suggests that it is important to analyze international
trade agreements between multiple countries of asymmetric size, something that we focus on
2For evidence of the positive relationship between market power and either import shares or GDP see Broda,
Limao and Weinstein (2008).
3In fact, if the asymmetry is su¢ ciently large, the large country would be strictly better o⁄by not cooperating
(cf. Johnson, 1953-54). An additional explanation for relatively higher tari⁄s by the large developed countries
on exports of small developing countries is that historically the latter have tended to not take an active role in
multilateral trade negotiations. One reason for such non-participation and higher tari⁄s by large countries arises
when, as in our setup, a large country imports the same good from many small countries. Ludema and Maya
(2009) show how the WTO MFN rule requiring the importer to set the same tari⁄ on all exporters lowers the
incentive for the latter to participate in reciprocal negotiations in an attempt to minimize reductions in their
own tari⁄s. Since this incentive is well understood theoretically we abstract from it (by assuming all exporters
either participate or not) and focus instead on the coordination externality.
4See for example Mayer (1981), Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Both the
latter and Saggi (2006) also consider a third large country to study tari⁄ discrimination.
5Authors calculations based on data from the WTO￿ s ￿International trade statistics 2010￿ . We treat the EU
as a country since it has a common tari⁄ and negotiates as a block thus world imports exclude ￿ ows within
EU-27.
2this paper.
While some of the recent decline of the US and EU in world trade is mirrored in the rise of
BRICs ￿particularly China ￿there is also a longer trend driven by other developing countries￿
trade liberalization and growth.6 This is important in motivating the coordination externality
underlying our model since this externality is most relevant if several countries jointly account
for a non-negligible amount of exports of a larger country. For example, in 2009 Asia accounted
for 14% of US exports if we exclude Japan, Australia and China, but the remaining 10 top
Asian importers of US goods had a median share of only 1.3% and still accounted for 13%
of US exports (the largest is Korea with less than 3%). Another case in point is South and
Central America: while the region jointly accounts for 10% of US exports all but one country
accounts for less than 1% (the only exception is Brazil, whose share is 2.5%). More broadly,
if in 2009 the US were to negotiate only with the top 5 destinations for its products it would
cover only 64% of its exports, with the analogous ￿gure for the EU being even smaller (44%).7
Our model highlights the role of bilateral size asymmetry in international trade agreements
by focusing on two ￿regions￿of similar size with one containing a single large country and the
other multiple countries each of whom individually has less market power in trade. The large
country exports a single good, x, to all small countries and imports a di⁄erent good in return.
The bilateral size asymmetry generates lower tari⁄s and welfare for the smaller countries in the
absence of an agreement because their tari⁄ choices are subject to a coordination externality,
i.e. when setting its tari⁄ on good x each small country ignores any positive terms-of-trade
e⁄ect that its tari⁄ has on all other importers of the same good. We then show that this
imbalance remains even if countries cooperate through a standard trade agreement that relies
on the threat of tari⁄ retaliation because cooperation is ultimately sustained by the threat of
non-cooperative tari⁄s, which are subject to the coordination externality.8 The small countries
6As the Director General of the WTO notes ￿Between 1973 and 1997 the developing countries￿ share of
manufactured imports in developed markets tripled ￿from 7.5 per cent to 23 per cent. What these ￿gures re￿ ect
is the developing world￿ s truly remarkable integration into the global economy over the past three decades.￿
Source: Ruggiero (1999) accessed at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/pr122_e.htm>. Besedes
and Prusa (2010) examine the sources of export growth for 46 countries between 1975-2003.
7Moreover, the recent increases in this dispersion measure suggests an increasingly important role for the
coordination externality among importers of US goods. For example, the top 5 US destinations in 2000 accounted
for 70% of its exports but those in 2009 only accounted for 64%. At the industry level we see a similar trend
with over 2/3 of HS 2 industries showing declines averaging 7 p.p. in the share of top 5 destinations (the average
for those with an increase was about 4 p.p.).
8We should note that tari⁄ retaliation at the WTO is permitted as a last resort after negotiations between
the a⁄ected parties have failed and any panel ruling calling for compliance has gone unheeded by the defendant.
3would gain from jointly threatening higher tari⁄s to punish any deviation by the large country
but this threat is not credible: in the event the agreement breaks down, each small country
has an individual incentive to free ride on the others if they were to try punishing the large
country via a jointly optimal Nash tari⁄.
Next, we examine how standard agreements ￿i.e. those based on tari⁄ retaliation alone
￿ can be reformed to counter the coordination externality and generate more e¢ cient and
equitable (i.e. symmetric) outcomes. More speci￿cally, we extend the standard trade agreement
to include ￿nancial instruments, i.e. some form of monetary payment incurred by countries who
deviate from the agreement. Such instruments have been proposed in the WTO, particularly
by developing countries arguing that their limited market power prevents them from using
tari⁄s to obtain proper compensation in case of a violation.9 It is straightforward to see that
if a violation does occur and compensation to the injured party can be enforced then it is
more e¢ cient to use a monetary transfer than a distortionary instrument such as a tari⁄.
What existing proposals typically neglect however, and what we focus on, is the more di¢ cult
question of how ￿nancial compensation can be enforced and whether such instruments can
deter deviations and generate more cooperation ex-ante.10
We show that agreements extended to include speci￿c ￿nancial instruments can enhance
cooperation and generate outcomes that are more symmetric relative to a standard trade agree-
ment. In particular, we show those improvements occur when countries exchange bonds prior
to trading and agree to forfeit them in case of a violation. This ￿nancial instrument targets
the coordination externality by removing the need for small countries to threaten non-credible
high tari⁄s; by requiring a high enough bond to be posted ex-ante we remove the incentive of
the large country to deviate (so as not to forfeit its bond).11 The appropriate choice of ￿nancial
instrument is therefore crucial and in fact we show that the obvious alternative, i.e. a monetary
9Such proposals have gained substantial attention in recent years during the Doha Round (cf. TN/DS/W/9,
2002) but have not yet been adopted. Earlier proposals as early as the 1960￿ s were put forward by developing
countries such as Brazil and Uruguay. For a recent, in-depth discussion of the legal and economic arguments in
favor of ￿nancial compensation as a means for settling trade disputes see Bronckers and Van Den Broek (2005).
10The ￿nancial transfers do not have to come directly from the country that violates the agreement. For
example, Mexico has proposed that countries should be allowed to sell their right to retaliate to others that
possess more market power to retaliate. This proposal has been analyzed by Bagwell et. al. (2007) in an auction
framework that assumes the violation has already occurred and a country has ￿earned￿ the right to retaliate
against another (o⁄ending) country. They show that in some cases it is the o⁄ending country that wins that
auction so the transfer is direct but that is not always the case.
11We further show that this bene￿t of bonds relative to the standard agreement is eliminated when the number
of countries goes to 2 (symmetric) ones, which is the special case that Limªo and Saggi (2008) study.
4￿ne, does not by itself improve on the standard agreement. The reason is precisely that the
payment of a ￿ne must be made by the violating country and must still be enforced by small
countries through the threat of tari⁄ retaliation that is subject to the coordination externality.
There are potentially important obstacles in reforming standard agreements to include
￿nancial instruments. The main obstacle we consider in our analysis is the limited ability to
post bonds with trading partners. We show that the results are robust to some bond constraints
even if they are severe for small countries provided the extended agreement includes both bonds
(posted by the large country) and ￿nes. However, if the bond constraint is also severe for the
large country then this extended agreement results in the same outcome as the standard trade
agreement.
Our basic approach is common in the literature on trade agreements: we model such agree-
ments as an equilibrium outcome of repeated interaction between governments. However, most
of this literature ignores the role of ￿nancial instruments. An exception is Bagwell and Staiger
(2005) who show that if governments face private anticipated shocks then cash transfers can
help enforce more cooperative tari⁄s. However, Limªo and Saggi (2008) show that their result
will not hold if we instead consider ￿nes enacted in the case of a deviation. The fact that
di⁄erent types of ￿nancial instruments lead to di⁄erent levels of tari⁄ cooperation highlights
the importance of carefully modelling each of their roles in international trade agreements.
Unlike these two papers, we examine countries that are asymmetric in their market power.
Park (2000) also examines cooperation between asymmetric countries but focuses on a case
where there is a single small country with no market power and one large country; he shows
that cash transfers from the former to the latter can help enforce lower tari⁄s. This purchase
of market access by a single in￿nitesimally small country is fundamentally di⁄erent from the
coordination externality among many small countries that we analyze and argue is empirically
relevant. Thus the results we ￿nd are naturally di⁄erent, e.g. we ￿nd that cooperation in tari⁄s
can be achieved without requiring the small countries to purchase market access from the large
country.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and describe the policy
externalities. In section 3 we derive the policy and welfare impacts of standard agreements,
contrast them with the extended agreements and analyze the implementation issues that may
arise. We conclude in section 4.
52 Setup and Trade Policy Externalities
2.1 Setup
The economic structure within each country is a standard one in the analysis of trade agree-
ments (c.f. Limªo and Saggi, 2008). However, instead of focusing on two symmetric countries,
we allow for multiple asymmetric countries. To clearly highlight the role of size asymmetries
we focus on a single large country trading with K > 1 smaller countries, where the latter are
identical among themselves.
Given the similar preferences and technologies across all countries, we describe the setup
in detail for the large country (using variables without asterisks), and then point out any
modi￿cation for the small ones. Each country can produce two homogeneous goods, i = x;y
and a numeraire, n. Individual utility over the consumption levels, c, of these goods is given by
u ￿ cn +
P
i ui(ci). Since utility is quasi-linear, the demand function for good i depends only
on its own price and is similar for all individuals so we denote aggregate demand by Di(pi).
Each unit of the numeraire, cn, is produced with a constant returns to scale technology using
only labor. Each non-numeraire good is also produced with a constant returns technology but
it uses both labor and a speci￿c factor. We denote the supply function for non-numeraire
goods by Si(pi), omitting its dependence on the speci￿c factor endowment since both labor and
speci￿c capital endowments are assumed constant and inelastically supplied.
We assume that the large country is a mirror image of the set of small countries so it
imports one of the non-numeraire goods, which we label y, and exports the other, x. Under
trade, the domestic import price in the large country is then py = pw
y + ￿ where pw is the
￿world￿price and ￿ is a speci￿c import tari⁄ on y. The large country￿ s imports of y are then
My ￿ Dy(py) ￿ Sy(py) and its world price is determined by the market clearing condition
My(pw




y ) = 0 (1)
where M￿k
y denote exports of good y by each of the k small countries. A similar condition
applies to good x.
We assume that no export policies are available so trade policy is described by the level of
the import tari⁄ in each country. Reductions in the large country￿ s import demand a⁄ect the
world price of y and it is simple to verify that in this setup an increase in the large country￿ s tari⁄
lowers the world price, pw
y (￿), and raises the domestic one. Similarly, if the K small countries
6jointly increased their tari⁄s on x they would reduce its world price; i.e. small countries as a
whole also have market power in trade.
The government chooses trade policies that maximize the political objective function below,









Si(pi)dpi + ￿iMi(pi)] + L (2)
where we recall that the tari⁄ ￿ a⁄ects W both directly through tari⁄ revenue, the term ￿yMy,
and through its e⁄ect on home prices; whereas the e⁄ect of small countries￿import tari⁄s, ￿￿,
is indirect and occurs only through the world price, pw
x(￿￿). In equation (2), the ￿rst term in
parenthesis is consumer surplus; the second term can be interpreted as producer surplus or the
quasi-rents accruing to the ￿xed factor owners; and the last term, L, is simply the total wage
income of the large country when the wage is unity.13
Each of the individual small countries has an objective function, which is denoted by W￿k.
It has the same functional form as (2) so we do not rewrite it but simply note that it is
evaluated using the prices and endowments in each k. To simplify the exposition and focus on
the size asymmetry we now describe some restrictions. Each of these K small countries owns
a constant fraction (1=K) of its region￿ s population (L￿) so L￿k = L￿=K and of its speci￿c
inputs. Moreover, given similar preferences, technologies and political parameters in the region
(￿￿k
i = ￿￿
i), the only potential di⁄erence that can arise across W￿k is if some k faces di⁄erent
prices because it sets or faces di⁄erent tari⁄s than the others. It will often be useful to focus
on equilibria where all small countries set a similar tari⁄, ￿￿ = ￿￿k for all k and face the same
tari⁄ exporting to Large, ￿, which can be di⁄erent from ￿￿. In this case prices and quantities
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i) (where Z￿ = D￿;S￿;M￿). Moreover, the aggregate political




i is W￿ ￿ ￿kW￿k = KW￿k.
We also assume that the two regions as a whole have similar population (L = L￿) and
similar supply of ￿xed factors in their respective import and export sector. This symmetry
assumption implies that the ￿aggregate￿market power of small countries is no di⁄erent from
that of the large country. This simpli￿es our exposition and is not crucial for our results; the
12This can be obtained as the reduced form of a political economy model such as Grossman and Helpman
(1994).
13We assume there is su¢ cient labor to ensure a positive supply of the numeraire so that the wage rate in the
economy is ￿xed by the marginal productivity of labor in the numeraire, which is normalized to unity.
7same is true of our assumption of similar political weights in each region (￿y = ￿￿
x = ￿) and
their absence in the respective export sectors (￿x = ￿￿
y = 1).
2.2 Trade Policy Externalities among Asymmetric Countries
The large country￿ s Nash tari⁄ is obtained by maximizing (2) while taking the small countries￿
tari⁄s as given. Since we do not model export policies we drop the good subscript, i, and any
subscripts below denote partial derivatives. Large￿ s Nash tari⁄ on y solves
￿N ￿ arg￿ maxW(￿;￿￿) (3)
Recalling that the equilibrium prices are a function of tari⁄s, the ￿rst order condition for ￿ is
￿Dp￿ + ￿Sp￿ + M + ￿Mpp￿ = 0 (4)
Using M = D ￿ S, p￿ = pw
￿ + 1 and the elasticity expressions de￿ned below we obtain a Nash










We show the potential dependence of the endogenous variables on the tari⁄. We do so for
clarity in the formula but will omit them below for notational simplicity. The ￿rst term,
1=" ￿ M￿=(pwM￿
p), is the inverse of the elasticity of the aggregate export supply curve of small
countries (since ￿ applies to all small countries) and it re￿ ects the large country￿ s terms-of-
trade motive for the use of tari⁄s. The second term re￿ ects a political economy motive that is
increasing in the extra weight placed on speci￿c factor owners (￿) and decreasing in the large
country￿ s import demand elasticity ￿ where ￿ ￿ ￿(@M=@pw)(pw=M) = ￿Mppw=M.
If the small countries can￿ t successfully coordinate their tari⁄ choices, then the Nash tari⁄




"￿k + (￿ ￿ 1)
S￿k=M￿k
￿￿k (6)
where all the variables are de￿ned similarly to ￿N in (5) but from the perspective of country
k, as detailed in the appendix.
A country￿ s import tari⁄s lowers the price received by exporters of that good, this is the
standard negative terms-of-trade externality, which we will con￿rm below is a central reason for
8a trade agreement. However, the outcome of that agreement will depend on another externality
that is present when there are several countries importing the same good, what we will refer to
as a coordination externality. To understand it suppose that small countries could coordinate
their tari⁄s choices in order to maximize their region￿ s aggregate objective, ￿kW￿k, then their
Nash tari⁄, denoted by ￿￿N, would be given by (6) evaluated at the aggregate regional quantities
(S￿=M￿) and elasticities, "￿ and ￿￿.We now argue that small countries set a higher tari⁄ when
acting jointly than individually because their market power is higher under coordination. We
show this by contradiction. Suppose ￿￿Nk and ￿￿N are identical and then evaluate the terms-
of-trade and political economy components of welfare. Note that given the symmetry across
small countries we have a similar ￿￿Nk across all of them and thus a similar price, therefore
(S￿k=M￿k)=￿￿k = (S￿=M￿)=￿￿, so if ￿￿Nk = ￿￿N and thus prices were identical then the political
economy component would be identical. However, if we evaluate the export supply elasticities
at similar prices then we can show that 1="￿k < 1="￿ if K > 1, (see the appendix for an exact
expression). The intuition for this is simple, when small countries set their tari⁄s independently,
each small country does not take into account the positive terms-of-trade bene￿ts that accrue
to other small countries. As might be expected, this coordination externality is increasing in
the number of countries.
The empirical relevance of the expressions above in tari⁄ policy setting requires at least
three pieces of evidence. First, countries should have at least some market power in imports.
Second, prior to trade agreements countries should set higher tari⁄s on products with higher
market power. Third, larger countries (in terms of GDP or import quantities) should have
more market power than smaller countries. Evidence for each of these is provided by Broda,
Limªo and Weinsten (2008).14 Evidence for the third point is particularly relevant for this
paper since as we divide a region of given size into a larger number of small countries (i.e. as
K increases) the GDP and imports of each shrinks, which is what drives down their relevant
measure of market power, 1="￿k.
As we noted before, to highlight the size di⁄erences it is useful to keep other factors constant.
If we assume symmetry across regions in their respective import and export sectors then we can
easily see two other implications. First, ￿N = ￿￿N and so the lack of coordination among small
countries would in this case imply that they have lower tari⁄s than the large one.15 Second, if
14They also ￿nd evidence of a positive impact of the political economy component, captured by (S=M)=￿.
15Note that ￿
N applies to good y and is independent of the tari⁄s that small countries set on x because the
utility function is quasilinear and separable and on the supply side the only mobile factor is labor, which has a
9there were no enforcement problems, then countries could choose tari⁄s to maximize their joint
objective W + KW￿k. With symmetric regions this is equivalent to maximizing the objective
of either region after imposing ￿ = ￿￿. Thus we obtain
￿G ￿ arg￿C maxW(￿C;￿￿ = ￿C) (7)
so the globally optimal ad-valorem tari⁄ ￿G=pw(￿G) (derived in the appendix) is
￿G
pw(￿)




It is simple to see that ￿G=pw < ￿N=pw. The di⁄erence between the Nash and globally
cooperative policies con￿rms that market power in trade leads to international externalities
motivating the need for a trade agreement (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). Note also that even in
the presence of an international agreement, countries may choose to have positive tari⁄s due
to internal political economy distortions (i.e. when ￿ > 1).16
Since the globally optimal tari⁄ ￿G is below the level that is optimal for each individual
country, each country has an incentive to deviate from it and would do so if it faced no punish-
ment. Before addressing how the threat of tari⁄retaliation can be used to sustain international
cooperation, we make an important observation. Note from (6) that if the number of small
countries is su¢ ciently high and governments face no political pressures (i.e. ￿ = 1), the Nash
tari⁄ of each small country in the absence of coordination among them, ￿￿Nk, approaches zero.
Under such circumstances, a small country cannot individually o⁄er any tari⁄ reduction to
the large country nor can it credibly threaten the large country with any tari⁄ retaliation in
case the latter reneges on a cooperative trade agreement. Thus, as K increases so does the
coordination externality and this lowers the incentive of the large country to enter into any
agreement that relies only on uncoordinated tari⁄retaliation to enforce cooperation. Naturally
if K is so high that the value of ￿￿N￿ is close to the global optimum ￿G then the large country
would always prefer not to cooperate at all. On the other hand, an individual small country has
a much stronger incentive to cooperate since it has limited ability to manipulate its terms of
trade. In what follows, we assume that K 2 (1; ￿ K], i.e. there is more than one ￿small￿country
wage pinned down by the numeraire sector productivity .
16Broda et al (2008) provide evidence that countries set higher protection in goods where they have higher
market power if they are either non-WTO members or the policy is not subject to strong WTO discipline.
Bagwell and Staiger (2011) ￿nd that WTO accession leads to greater tari⁄ reductions in products with higher
initial import volumes and market power.
10(thus the asymmetry) but not so many of them as to make their cooperation unattractive to
the large country.17
3 Trade Agreements among Asymmetric Countries
3.1 Standard Agreements: Asymmetric Outcomes under Tari⁄ Retaliation
We now examine the role of agreements in enforcing tari⁄ cooperation between asymmetric
countries. We show that if standard agreements, which rely solely on tari⁄ threats, can￿ t
sustain the globally optimal tari⁄ for all countries then the outcome is an asymmetric one with
a higher tari⁄ set by the large country than the small ones (Proposition 1). The asymmetry is
driven by the coordination externality previously highlighted. In the next section, we show that
if we go beyond the enforcement instruments in standard agreements and include ￿nancial ones
then we can both improve cooperation and make the outcome more equitable by sustaining the
symmetric global tari⁄ (Propositions 2 and 3).
Consider an in￿nitely repeated game where the stage game delivers the Nash tari⁄s previ-
ously derived, i.e. ￿N and ￿￿Nk. Assume that countries observe each other￿ s actions at the end
of each period. The strategy for each country is to cooperate until any country deviates by
raising its tari⁄. Any such deviation is followed by a punishment of n periods during which the
country that originally deviated faces Nash tari⁄s on its exports and demonstrates its willing-
ness to restart cooperation by setting a cooperative tari⁄ level. If this occurs then cooperative
tari⁄s are set by all after the n periods, otherwise the agreement breaks down and countries
permanently revert to Nash tari⁄s.
To ￿nd the lowest cooperative tari⁄ that is weakly renegotiation proof (or simply WRP)
we ￿rst de￿ne each country￿ s payo⁄s under the alternative situations that can arise.18 Let ￿￿N
represent the vector of Nash tari⁄s composed of each of the small countries tari⁄s, ￿￿Nk. In
the absence of cooperation, the payo⁄ to the large country equals its government￿ s objective
17A su¢ cient condition for the large country to accept ￿ ￿ ￿













, which holds strictly when K = 1. There are su¢ cient free parameters in the
model to ensure that the condition also holds for some K > 1. But there is some ￿ K such that ￿
￿Nk(K) is so low
that the condition above holds with equality and thus we assume that K 2 (1; ￿ K] .
18One reason to focus on renegotiation proof agreements is provided by Ludema (2001) who shows that the
reliance on reciprocity during dispute settlement at the WTO implies that only trade agreements that are
renegotiation proof can be sustained in equilibrium.
11evaluated at non-cooperative tari⁄s:
WN ￿ W(￿N;￿￿N) (9)
The cooperative tari⁄ vector (to be found) for the small countries is represented by ￿￿C
and its representative element, ￿￿Ck, will be common to all k during periods of cooperation
since these countries are identical. We denote the large country￿ s cooperative tari⁄ by ￿C so
the cooperative payo⁄ of the large country is:
WC ￿ W(￿C;￿￿C) (10)
If the large country deviates, it does so by imposing its optimal Nash tari⁄ ￿N on each of
the small countries who, in that period, are still setting cooperative tari⁄s.19 The deviation
payo⁄ to the large in the period is
WD ￿ W(￿N;￿￿C) (11)
According to the strategy we consider if the large country deviates, then in each of the n
punishment periods its payo⁄ is
WP ￿ W(￿C;￿￿N)
We can then de￿ne the large country￿ s continuation payo⁄ after a deviation as:
V ￿ ￿ ￿n
t=1￿tWP + ￿1
t=n+1￿tWC (12)
i.e. it undergoes punishment for n periods after which cooperation resumes. Given these
payo⁄s, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint for the large country to cooperate is




That is, the sum of the payo⁄ from a deviation, WD, and the continuation payo⁄, V ￿, should
not exceed the present value of the stream of cooperative payo⁄s.
Since the per period punishment payo⁄ is lower than the Nash payo⁄, i.e. WP < WN, the
punishment phase is subgame perfect only if it is not pro￿table for the country that is being
punished (in this case the large country) to simply abandon the agreement and revert to Nash
19The large country￿ s deviation level tari⁄ level is independent of the level for the small ones because of the
separability across sectors.
12tari⁄s forever. So V ￿ must be at least as large as the Nash payo⁄ in order for the cooperative





Because WC > WP, the longer the punishment phase n, the lower the continuation payo⁄ V ￿.
Therefore, the maximum punishment phase that is WRP is found by equating the continuation
payo⁄ V ￿ to the RHS of (14). We de￿ne this maximum punishment period as nmax, and it is
implicitly given by










Therefore, the lowest cooperative WRP tari⁄ is obtained at nmax and implicitly de￿ned
when (13) holds with equality. Given the maximum WRP punishment it is also simple to
see that this cooperative tari⁄ level would obtain under an alternative strategy where if any
country deviates then they all permanently revert to Nash. To see this clearly, we substitute








which is identical to the large country￿ s incentive constraint under in￿nite Nash reversion. Thus
the lowest self-enforcing tari⁄ under in￿nite Nash reversion or WRP is implicitly de￿ned when
(16) holds with equality.
To understand the e⁄ect of the coordination externality on cooperation, note that the worst
punishment that uncoordinated small countries can in￿ ict on the large one is for each to revert
to its individual Nash tari⁄, ￿￿Nk, which is lower than their coordinated punishment tari⁄, ￿￿N.
Therefore, for any given cooperative tari⁄, the total payo⁄ of deviating for the large country,
as given by the LHS of (16), is greater relative to the case where small countries coordinate
their tari⁄decisions. In other words, the lack of coordination between small countries increases
the large country￿ s incentive to deviate, which is one component of the asymmetric outcome.
The other component arises because the coordination externality reduces the incentive of each
small country to deviate since the short-term gain from such a deviation is smaller relative to
coordination.20 To see this more explicitly we now derive the IC for each small country.
20The incentive to deviate by the small countries is also reduced by the fact that reversion to Nash is more
costly to them, which implies that if they would deviate the large country would impose a relatively harsher
punishment that would still be WRP.
13We use ￿￿Nk to denote the tari⁄ vector of small countries when a set of them deviate.
To clearly highlight the coordination externality one consider two polar cases. First if all
small countries deviate at the same time then ￿￿Nk = ￿￿N. Second, if only one small country
deviates then it charges ￿￿Nk, which must be evaluated at the world price for the large country￿ s
export good x when the other j 6= k still set ￿￿Cj. It is simple to show that the results below
are qualitatively independent of which of these two alternatives are used. Therefore, in what
follows, we consider a scenario where if one small country happens to deviate, then they all do
and set their individually optimal Nash tari⁄s.21








We use these incentive constraints to establish lemma 1, which is a building block to showing
that the coordination externality leads to asymmetric tari⁄s in standard agreements.
Lemma 1 (Asymmetric cooperation incentives under standard agreements): At
a given symmetric cooperative tari⁄ the payo⁄ to the large country is higher than the respective
aggregate payo⁄ to K uncoordinated small countries under (i) a deviation from cooperation, i.e.
W(￿N;￿￿C) > ￿kW￿k(￿C;￿￿Nk) at ￿C = ￿￿Ck and (ii) non-cooperation, i.e. W(￿N;￿￿N) >
￿kW￿k(￿N;￿￿N.
Proof : To see (i) recall that if all small countries set similar policies then ￿kW￿k = KW￿k
and this ￿regional￿welfare measure is mirror symmetric to W so if ￿C = ￿￿Ck and ￿￿ = ￿N
for all small countries we have the equality below
W(￿ = ￿N;￿￿ = ￿C) = KW￿k(￿ = ￿C;￿￿ = ￿N)
> KW￿k(￿ = ￿C;￿￿Nk)
where the inequality arises because ￿N = ￿￿N maximizes KW￿k for a given ￿C and the elements
of ￿￿Nk are smaller than ￿N (from (6) when K > 1).
21To understand why the two alternatives yield similar qualitative results note that under either scenario the
maximum punishment payo⁄ is identical since it is pinned down by in￿nite reversion. So, at given cooperative
tari⁄s, the two scenarios di⁄er with respect to the deviation payo⁄ for small countries under individual vs.
simultaneous (but uncoordinated) deviation. This payo⁄ di⁄ers across the two alternatives because the world
price of the good at which ￿
￿Nk is evaluated di⁄ers. However, in either case the deviation payo⁄ to the large






￿C), which is key to our results.
14To see (ii) note that symmetry implies that
W(￿N;￿￿ = ￿N) = KW￿k(￿N;￿￿ = ￿N)
which implies that
W(￿N;￿￿N) > W(￿N;￿￿ = ￿N) = KW￿k(￿N;￿￿ = ￿N)
This is because ￿￿N = ￿￿Nk for all K and it is smaller than ￿N (from (6)) and so the export
price obtained by the large country is higher relative to when it faces ￿N in all small countries.
Furthermore, we have
KW￿k(￿N;￿￿ = ￿N) > KW￿k(￿N;￿￿N)
This is because ￿￿ = ￿N for all K maximizes the aggregate payo⁄ of small countries for
any given tari⁄ of the large country, not ￿￿N whose elements comprise of K tari⁄s each of
which equals ￿￿Nk < ￿￿N. Combining the last two inequalities we obtain W(￿N;￿￿N) >
￿kW￿k(￿N;￿￿N). QED
Lemma 1 ￿xes the cooperative tari⁄ at a ￿xed symmetric level to highlight the fact that
the larger country may have a weaker incentive to cooperate than the uncoordinated small
countries. We now show that this coordination externality not only generates an imbalance in
market power across countries but it also generates asymmetric cooperative tari⁄s (and thus
unequal welfare outcomes) in a trade agreement enforced by the threat of tari⁄ retaliation.
As will be clear enforcement is only an issue if the large country is not su¢ ciently patient to
sustain the global optimum tari⁄ in a standard agreement, i.e. if ￿ < ￿G where ￿G is implicitly
de￿ned to ensure that the the incentive constraint in (16) is satis￿ed at ￿G.
Proposition 1 (Asymmetric outcomes under standard agreements):
In a standard trade agreement supported by the threat of tari⁄ retaliation, the most cooperative
tari⁄ set by a large country exceeds the tari⁄ set by each of the K uncoordinated small countries:
i.e. ￿C > ￿￿Ck whenever the large country is not su¢ ciently patient to sustain the globally
optimal tari⁄ (￿ < ￿G) and thus this agreement yields higher welfare for the large country than
for the set of small ones, i.e. W(￿C;￿￿C) > KW￿k(￿C;￿￿C).
Proof: Suppose that ￿ = ￿G so that by de￿nition the incentive constraint of the large country
(16) holds with equality when each country sets its tari⁄ to equal the globally optimal tari⁄
￿G. The incentive constraint for a typical small country is similar to (16), except that small
15country exporters face a higher tari⁄relative to that faced by exporters from the large country,
i.e. ￿N > ￿￿Nk, and the payo⁄ of each small country is divided by K (but K cancels out
because it enters similarly on both sides of the IC). Thus, the cooperative payo⁄ for the small
countries as a group is equal to that for the large one (due to symmetry) and the payo⁄s for
small countries from deviating are smaller, as shown in lemma 1. This means that at ￿G, where
(16) holds with equality, there must be slack in the corresponding IC for each small country. If
we lower ￿ below ￿G then the large country￿ s incentive constraint (16) no longer holds at ￿G. So
under tari⁄ retaliation, the global optimum is not feasible for ￿ < ￿G. But the corresponding
constraint for each small country continues to hold and has slack, at least for some ￿ < ￿G.
Since, by de￿nition, for any ￿ < ￿G tari⁄retaliation cannot sustain ￿G, to prove Proposition
1 we need only show that when ￿ < ￿G the lowest self-enforcing cooperative tari⁄s used are
such that ￿C > ￿￿Ck. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that the lowest self-enforcing
cooperative tari⁄s for all countries is the same, i.e., ￿C = ￿￿Ck and that it is such that the
IC of the large country (16) binds.22 We then show that if ￿C = ￿￿Ck then the IC of a small
country (17) has slack implying that such a tari⁄ is not the most cooperative tari⁄ on the part
of small countries. Since the RHS of (16) is equal to K times the RHS of (17) at ￿C = ￿￿Ck
(due to symmetry) we need only show that the LHS of (16) exceeds K times the RHS of (17),
which is done in lemma 1. Given this there must be some ￿￿Ck < ￿C for small countries that
is still self-enforcing since the reduction in ￿￿Ck reduces the slack in (17) without violating the
large country￿ s IC in (16).
Given the asymmetry in the cooperative tari⁄s, the large country will have a higher welfare
than the collection of small ones even though they are mirror images and there is constant
returns to scale in production.23QED
3.2 Extended Agreements: E¢ ciency and Equity with Financial Instru-
ments
We now show how the coordination externality can be o⁄set when we extend the set of en-
forcement instruments to allow for certain type of ￿nancial instruments. We show that such
an extended trade agreement generates (i) an improvement in global welfare relative to the
22It is clear that we need not consider the case where ￿
C > ￿
￿Ck.
23This is not to say that the welfare distribution across countries is more unequal under the agreement than
non-cooperation since the Nash policies are also asymetric. In fact, if ￿ = ￿G the agreement sustains the
symmetric global optimum and so generates a more equal welfare distribution than non-cooperation and so this
must also be true for at least some ￿ < ￿G.
16standard agreement and (ii) more symmetric welfare outcomes across countries.
First, we consider the exchange of bonds as a means for sustaining cooperation when coun-
tries pursue the following strategy. Countries start cooperating by posting a bond with each of
its import sources. At the end of a period, if the countries have cooperated then they ￿return￿
their respective bonds. If a country deviates from the cooperative tari⁄, it loses its bond. For
cooperation to resume, the deviating country must return the present discounted value of the
bond of the injured country. If it does so in the period after the deviation occurs, then tari⁄s
return to the cooperative level. If it does not, cooperation breaks down and all countries switch
to their optimal Nash tari⁄s.
To understand the basic insight, consider a situation where the large country￿ s patience level
is just below that which is required to sustain the global optimum under a standard agreement
(i.e. ￿ is just below ￿G) while the small countries are patient enough. If we then allowed the
large country to post a bond with a value exceeding what it receives from the collection of small
countries then its incentive to deviate declines (it stands to lose more from forfeiting its bond)
so its cooperative tari⁄ would be lower. While this would also increase each small country￿ s
incentive to deviate, it would not a⁄ect its cooperative tari⁄ since the incentive constraint of
each small country has slack at the initial symmetric tari⁄s ￿C = ￿￿Ck = ￿G for some ￿ < ￿G.
We demonstrate this intuition formally below.
Suppose the large country posts a bond of value bk (in units of the numeraire) with each
of the small countries it imports from, and receives ￿kb￿k from them. Since all small countries
are ex-ante identical we assume from the start that when cooperating they each post a similar
value bond, b￿k = b￿, and receive a similar share of the large country￿ s bond, bk = b=K. The
WRP incentive constraint for the large country and each of the small countries are respectively
given by








where their respective continuation payo⁄s are de￿ned as














17The ￿rst term in the large country￿ s continuation payo⁄V b equals the present value of the bonds
posted by the small countries that must be returned by the large country for cooperation to
resume and the second term is the present discounted value of its payo⁄ under cooperation. A
similar interpretation applies to a small country￿ s continuation payo⁄ V ￿b.
We now derive the minimum bond values required to enforce the global optimum assuming
the WRP constraint is satis￿ed (which we will verify below). To do so, we substitute these
continuation payo⁄s into (18) and (19) respectively and solve for bg and b￿g:
bg = W(￿N;￿￿G) ￿ W(￿G;￿￿G) (22)
b￿g = W￿k(￿G;￿￿Nk) ￿ W￿k(￿G;￿￿G) (23)
These bond values are quite intuitive: the minimum bonds required to achieve globally optimal
tari⁄s are equal to each country￿ s terms-of-trade gain of deviating from those tari⁄s. Further
note that the large country requires a larger bond than the set of K small countries. That is,
bg > Kb￿g since W(￿N;￿￿G) > KW￿k(￿G;￿￿N￿) (as proved in Lemma 1) and W(￿G;￿￿G) =
KW￿k(￿G;￿￿G) (due to symmetry). In sum, since the large country deviates to an optimal
tari⁄, ￿N, that is larger than the optimal tari⁄ of a typical small country (￿￿Nk), its terms-
of-trade gain from deviating is larger than the corresponding total gain of K uncoordinated
small countries. Therefore, the large country must post a larger bond, i.e. bg > Kb￿g, which
reduces its incentive to deviate relative to that under tari⁄ retaliation thereby opening up the
possibility of increased cooperation.
The ￿nal step is to show that there is some ￿ < ￿G such that tari⁄ retaliation does not
enforce globally optimal tari⁄s whereas the bonds bg and b￿g do while also satisfying the WRP
constraint. Let bmax be the bond value that equates the continuation payo⁄ of a small country
V ￿b in (21) to its payo⁄ from abandoning the agreement W￿k(￿N;￿￿N)￿=(1 ￿ ￿). We have













In other words, if the bond posted by the large country exceeds bmax, then a typical small coun-
try is better o⁄ cheating on the agreement and abandoning it altogether since its continuation
payo⁄ falls below what it gets outside the agreement.
Similarly, let b￿max be the value of the bond posted by a small country that equates the
18large country￿ s continuation payo⁄ V b in (21) to W(￿N;￿￿N)￿=(1 ￿ ￿), i.e. its payo⁄ from
abandoning the agreement. We have











Note that since W(￿N;￿￿N) > KW￿k(￿N;￿￿N), we have that bmax > Kb￿max at any
symmetric cooperative tari⁄. The intuition for this is clear: due to its greater market power,
abandoning the agreement is relatively more attractive to the large country and therefore a
smaller (aggregate) bond on the part of small countries is necessary to ensure that the large
country prefers to resume cooperation by returning bonds of small countries as opposed to
abandoning the agreement. In other words, since cooperation is relatively less attractive to the
large country, it is willing to su⁄er a relatively smaller punishment to resume cooperation (as
measured by the value of bonds it has to repay to resume cooperation).
As before, if the bonds posted by the small countries exceed Kb￿max, the continuation payo⁄
of the large country is too low for it to prefer to resume cooperation as opposed to abandoning
the agreement altogether. The two WRP constraints together ensure that the bonds required
to sustain the global optimum (￿G;￿￿G) are not so high that countries prefer to abandon the
agreement altogether:
bg ￿ bmax(￿G;￿￿G) and b￿g ￿ b￿max(￿G;￿￿G)
First consider bg ￿ bmax(￿G;￿￿G). Using the de￿nition of ￿G and re-arranging (16) we have
W(￿N;￿￿G) ￿ W(￿G;￿￿G) =
￿G[W(￿G;￿￿G) ￿ W(￿N;￿￿N)]
1 ￿ ￿G













19The last inequality follows from the coordination externality, which implies that W(￿N;￿￿N) >
W￿(￿N;￿￿N) for K > 1, as proved in Lemma 1. Since the RHS in the last line is equal to
bmax evaluated at the globally optimal tari⁄s and it is continuous in ￿ , we have that when
K > 1 there exist ￿ < ￿G s.t. bg ￿ bmax(￿G;￿￿G). Intuitively, the inequality above says that
at the critical discount factor where the large country￿ s incentive constraint just binds under
tari⁄ retaliation (i.e. at ￿ = ￿G), the bond bg that the large country has to post in order to
sustain cooperation over the global optimum is less than the maximum bond bmax(￿G;￿￿G) that
satis￿es the WRP constraint at globally optimal tari⁄s (which equals the present discounted
value of cooperation to small countries as a whole discounted by one period).










where the ￿rst inequality follows from W(￿G;￿￿G) = W￿(￿G;￿￿G) (by symmetry) and W(￿N;￿￿G) >
W￿(￿G;￿￿Nk) for K > 1, as proved in Lemma 1. The equality on the second line follows from
the de￿nition of ￿G. Since the RHS in the last line is equal to Kb￿max(￿G;￿￿G) in (25b), and
is continuous in ￿G, we have that when K > 1 there exists a ￿ < ￿G s.t. b￿g ￿ b￿max(￿G;￿￿G).
Intuitively, the last inequality says that at the critical discount factor where the large country￿ s
incentive constraint just binds under tari⁄ retaliation (i.e. at ￿ = ￿G), the collective value of
the bonds posted by small countries required to sustain cooperation over the global optimum
is less than the present discounted value of cooperation to the large country (discounted by one
period).
Proposition 2 (Improved cooperation and symmetric outcomes with bond ex-
change):
In a trade agreement extended to include bond exchange as an enforcement instrument the
large country and the K uncoordinated small countries can sustain the globally optimal tari⁄s
(￿C = ￿￿Ck = ￿G) even if they can not enforce it under a standard agreement. Therefore,
for some ￿ < ￿G, the extended agreement generates (i) an increase in welfare for the small
countries; (ii) a global increase in welfare and (iii) a more equitable outcome relative to the
standard agreement.
The ￿rst part of the proposition follows directly from what we showed above: that there
20exist WRP bonds that sustain the global optimum for at least some ￿ < ￿G. Since the global
optimum tari⁄s are symmetric it follows that the outcome is more equitable than under the
standard agreement where the large country sets higher tari⁄s than the small ones (part iii).
Moreover, the tari⁄s for the large country are lower under the extended agreement and those
for the small countries are no higher (at least for some ￿ < ￿G) so welfare is higher for small
countries (part i) and globally since W + KW￿k is concave and decreasing in tari⁄s above the
global optimum.
To understand the intuition behind proposition 2 it is useful to consider an extreme case
where K = 1 so the asymmetry disappears. In that case the bonds that can support the
global optimum can only be WRP if ￿ = ￿G, as we can see from (26) and (27) but if the
two symmetric countries are that patient then they can sustain ￿G in a standard agreement.
More generally, if ￿ < ￿G and two symmetric countries exchange bonds then their incentives
to deviate remain unchanged because their bonds are of equal value (as shown in Limªo and
Saggi, 2008). However, if countries are asymmetric then we can require one to post a bigger
bond than its smaller partner to o⁄set its incentive to deviate from cooperative tari⁄s. This
increases the incentive to deviate by the smaller country (to keep the bigger bond) but the
threat of future tari⁄ retaliation prevents it from doing so.
This proposition provides an enforcement rationale for why some small countries have ad-
vocated for trade agreements to be extended to include ￿nancial instruments. We now discuss
possible obstacles to reforming standard agreements to include ￿nancial instruments.
3.3 Agreement Reform
There are potentially important obstacles in reforming standard agreements to include ￿nan-
cial enforcement instruments. The main obstacle we focus on is the limited ability and/or
willingness to post bonds with trading partners. We show that even severe ￿bond constraints￿
for small countries can be overcome to achieve the outcomes in Proposition 2 if we design the
extended agreement to also include ￿nes. However, if the bond constraint is also severe for the
large country then this extended agreement will result in the same asymmetric outcome as the
standard one. These results highlight the importance of formally modelling alternative instru-
ments to successfully reform standard agreements. We also discuss how to overcome another
potential obstacle; namely, that the large country may oppose moving from the standard to
the extended agreement if the latter simply entails lower tari⁄s for itself but not its smaller
21trading partners.
It is not di¢ cult to motivate or provide a simple formal model of why certain countries may
be unable or unwilling to post a large bond at the start of a period in order to induce another
country to set a more cooperative tari⁄. Therefore, instead of committing to a speci￿c motive
for this we instead assume that countries face exogenous ￿bond constraints￿ , i.e. b < bg and
b￿ < b￿g, and in Proposition 3 we show that the outcome in Proposition 2 can be achieved
even if the small countries post no bond at all and the large one posts a bond that is of a
value smaller than bg but still positive. So bond constraints may not be an important obstacle
to reform a standard agreement even if they are very severe for small countries (if b￿ = 0).
However, in order for agreements to generate e¢ cient and symmetric outcomes in the presence
of bond constraints we need to include another ￿nancial instrument in the trade agreement, i.e.,
a ￿ne. The advantage of ￿nes over bonds is that the latter must be posted every period before
trading starts whereas ￿nes need only be paid if a deviation ever occurs and are therefore not
subject to the same type of ￿nancial constraint that bonds are. This raises the question if we
need bonds at all in an extended agreement with ￿nes and in Proposition 4 we also constrain
b = 0 to show that they must be included and posted by the large country.24
To understand why ￿nes can overcome bond constraints on small but not large countries
we must explain why WRP ￿nes face an enforcement issue relative to bonds. Namely, the
deviating country has to be induced to pay the ￿ne, whereas the bond is already in the hands
of its partner and is thus automatically foregone. Thus ￿nes require some threat of tari⁄
retaliation if they are not paid. We model this tari⁄ threat as a last resort that would only
ever materialize if the agreement breaks down. So, the large country will ￿nd it easy to enforce
large ￿nes, which prevents small ones from deviating even if they post no bond (b￿ = 0). But
small countries will not have the same ability due to the coordination externality and in fact
the only ￿nes they can enforce when b = 0.
Proposition 3 summarizes the results when the extended agreement includes ￿nes and coun-
tries face some bond constraints.
24One simple way to model the ￿bond constraints￿is to assume that production of the numeraire can only
take place after policies are set so none of it is available for the initial bonds. If we want the larger country to
be able to post some bond we can allow it to have some endowment of the numeraire available at the start of
the period. To maintain symmetry we can allow for a similar endowment for the K small countries that is only
available after the policies are set so it a⁄ects only their ability to post a bond.
22Proposition 3 (Improved cooperation and symmetric outcomes with ￿nes and
bond constraints):
In a trade agreement extended to include WRP ￿nes and constrained bond exchange ( b 2
[~ bg;bg); b￿ 2 [0;b￿g)) the large country and the K uncoordinated small countries can sustain
the globally optimal tari⁄s (￿C = ￿￿Ck = ￿G) even if they can not enforce it under a standard
agreement. Therefore, for some ￿ < ￿G, there is a ~ bg > 0 such that this agreement generates
(i) an increase in welfare for the small countries; (ii) a global increase in welfare and (iii) a
more equitable outcome relative to the standard agreement. Furthermore these results hold even
if the small countries face severe bond constraints, i.e. if b￿ = 0.
Proof:
To prove Proposition 3 we need only show that for some ￿ < ￿G the global optimum can
be sustained using bonds b￿ = 0 < b￿g and b < bg. Once that is done the results in (i), (ii) and
(iii) follow directly from the same arguments in proposition 2. Consider the following strategy:
similarly to before, each country must ￿rst post a bond in order for cooperation to begin. We
will focus on the case where the total value of this bond is ~ b > 0 for the large country (equally
divided among the K small countries) whereas b￿ is arbitrarily small, in practice b￿ = 0. If
a country deviates, it loses its bond but keeps any foreign bond(s) it may hold. But now, if
a deviation were to occur then cooperation resumes only after a ￿ne is paid by the deviating
country. The incentive constraints for the large and each of the small countries are respectively









and the minimum continuation payo⁄s for each are
V
~ b ￿ ￿￿f +
￿W(￿G;￿￿G)
1 ￿ ￿
and V ￿~ b ￿ ￿￿f￿ +
￿W￿k(￿G;￿￿G)
1 ￿ ￿
where f and f￿ are the ￿ne values paid by the large and small countries respectively. As
before, we require the continuation payo⁄ to be WRP in that no country prefers to abandon
the agreement altogether. This implies that the minimum continuation payo⁄ for each country
23must be no lower than the payo⁄ obtained under non-cooperation:
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These constraints pin down the maximum ￿ne that each country is willing to pay and re-









~ bmin in (28) by ￿W(￿N;￿￿N)=(1 ￿ ￿) allows us to solve for the minimum bond
required to sustain globally optimal tari⁄s.






To clearly see the relationship between this and the bond required without ￿nes we rewrite the
expression above and use the value of bg in (22) to obtain






[W(￿G;￿￿G) ￿ W(￿N;￿￿N)] < bg (32)
The inequality ~ bg < bg holds because the second term in parenthesis (i.e. W(￿G;￿￿G) ￿
W(￿N;￿￿N)) is positive whenever the number of small countries is small enough that the
large country prefers a cooperative trade agreement to a trade war, which is our assumption
throughout (see footnote 17). Intuitively, when ￿nes can be used in conjunction with bonds,
the large country can post a lower bond because the threat of the maximum ￿ne fmax (o⁄ the
equilibrium path) ensures that its continuation payo⁄is no higher than when ￿nes are not used
(since it equals ￿W(￿N;￿￿N)=(1 ￿ ￿) in either case) while the posting of zero bonds by small
countries implies that its short term gain of deviating from cooperation is lower relative to the
case without ￿nes. It should also be clear that for ￿ < ￿G we have ~ bg > 0 since if ￿ = ￿G then
~ bg = 0 and reducing ￿ reduces the gains from cooperation, which is the second term in (32).
24To show that ~ bg does not violate the incentive constraint for small countries in (29) we














This is simply the sum of the IC in the standard agreement given by (16) and (17) when
evaluated at the global optimum. We know that at ￿G the IC for the large country holds with
equality at ￿G and the IC for each small country holds with slack (Proposition 1) so (33) holds
strictly at ￿G and continuity ensures it must also hold for some ￿ < ￿G. QED
An immediate corollary is that if the bond constraints were also severe for the large country,
i.e. b = 0 = b￿, then the proposition would not hold since ~ bg > 0 unless ￿ = ￿G. In fact, such
constraints generate the same outcome as the standard agreement. The intuition is straight-
forward: the outcome under the standard agreement is ultimately determined by the threat of
the agreement breaking down and thus in￿nite tari⁄ reversion, which is the same threat that
enforces ￿nes so the two yield the same IC. To see this more clearly we can substitute the
minimum continuation payo⁄s for the extended agreement, V
~ bmin and V ￿~ bmin, and set ~ b = 0
in the IC in (28) and (29). Evaluating these at a general cooperative tari⁄ level (instead of
requiring it to be the global optimum) we obtain the IC under the standard agreement, (16)
and (17). Proposition 4 summarizes this result
Proposition 4: (Equivalence of standard and extended agreements with ￿nes
under severe bond constraints):
A trade agreement extended to include WRP ￿nes and subject to severe constraints on bond
exchange (b = b￿ = 0) yields the same outcomes as those in Proposition 1 for a standard trade
agreement supported by tari⁄ retaliation.
This last result makes it clear that an extended agreement has to be carefully designed to
include the relevant instruments. In this case, what is needed is a bond posted by the large
country that removes the need for small countries to coordinate on a particular tari⁄ level in
case a retaliation is required.
Any of the agreements considered thus far increases the payo⁄s for each of the countries
relative to non-cooperation. However, large countries and small countries can have di⁄erent
preferred agreements since for some ￿ < ￿G we obtain ￿C > ￿￿Ck = ￿G under the stan-
dard agreement (Proposition 1) and ￿C = ￿￿Ck = ￿G under the extended agreements with ~ bg
25(Propositions 2 and 3). Therefore, the small countries prefer the extended agreement but the
large country prefers the standard one since W
￿
￿;￿￿G￿
is increasing in its own tari⁄ when
￿ < ￿N. This raises the question of whether the large country would want to reform the stan-
dard agreement (or choose the extended one if both were on the table). One simple answer
is that countries adopt the agreement yielding the highest global political welfare if there is a
one-o⁄transfer mechanism available between them. In this case the extended agreement would
be adopted since it generates the highest global welfare (Propositions 2 and 3).
The issue is more complicated if there is no initial transfer mechanism to potentially com-
pensate the large country. However, even in this case we argue that a small modi￿cation to the
extended agreement can make it su¢ ciently attractive for the large country, namely: to allow
it to increase its tari⁄ to a level between the standard and extended agreement, ￿C > ￿ > ￿G,
and require a reduction by the small countries, ￿￿Ck < ￿G. Clearly this would increase the
large country welfare relative to the initial extended agreement. Moreover, if the tari⁄ changes
are small enough they would not cause a ￿rst order loss in global welfare (since it is maximized
at ￿G) so that the extended agreement could still be globally preferred to the standard one.25
Naturally, both the initial transfer and the readjustment of cooperative tari⁄s that make the
extended agreement more attractive for the large country also reduce some of its attractiveness
to the small ones and would not generate symmetric outcomes. But the small countries would
still enjoy higher welfare than under non-cooperation or the standard agreement.
4 Conclusion
The multilateral trading system has changed dramatically since 23 founding members signed the
GATT in 1947. The WTO now comprises 153 members, many of which are small individually
but jointly account for a substantial fraction of trade. The recent emergence of the BRICs
and the longer trend of trade liberalization across the developing world has eroded the relative
standing of the US and EU in world trade. These salient changes in the global economic
landscape have also started to alter the dynamic underlying multilateral trade negotiations.
Whereas the ￿rst eight rounds of trade negotiations saw limited participation from developing
countries and were led primarily by the USA and the EU, the most recent, and currently
25The logic of propositions 2 and 3 should still apply in this case and in fact we conjecture that the bond
required by the large country would be smaller than ~ b
g in Proposition 3 since at ￿ > ￿
G it has less incentive to
deviate. When the small countries receive a lower bond they too have less incentive to deviate (but that is at
least partially o⁄set by the higher incentive from having ￿
￿Ck < ￿
G).
26ongoing, round of negotiations ￿i.e. the Doha Round ￿puts (or at least claims to put) the
interests of developing countries at center stage.
The increasingly dispersed pattern of world trade along with the increased participation of
developing countries at the WTO suggests that the standard two-country paradigm underlying
formal models of international trade agreements may no longer adequately capture actual trade
negotiations. In this paper we analyze one basic problem that arises under this ￿new trade
order￿ : a coordination externality among countries that import a common good. The exter-
nality is strongest when each importer is bilaterally small relative to the exporter, but would
have a reasonable degree of market power if it were to coordinate its tari⁄ choices with other
importers. This coordination externality implies that smaller countries have less of a threat to
use tari⁄s and therefore a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce cooperation from
larger countries. Thus international cooperation based on the threat of tari⁄ retaliation yields
an asymmetric equilibrium outcome that is biased in favor of the large country.
We examine the use of ￿nancial instruments as a means for resolving this coordination
externality and the asymmetric outcome that results because of it. To this end, we consider
an extended trade agreement under which countries post bonds prior to trading, with the
understanding that a country violating the agreement would forfeit its bond. We show that the
use of bonds in this fashion does not su⁄er from the coordination externality that characterizes
the tari⁄choices of small countries. Indeed, we ￿nd that when the trade agreement is extended
to allow for bonds, the resulting outcome is preferable from both an e¢ ciency and equity
perspective.26 Since the implementation of such an extended agreement might be problematic
due to the inability to post bonds (especially on the part of small countries) we show that
our results hold even if small countries do not post any bonds at all provided the extended
agreement allows for ￿nes. Furthermore, the use of such ￿nes also allows the large country to
post a smaller bond.
The new trade order arising from the relative decline of the US and EU driven by the
emergence of several smaller developing countries in the world trading system raises a number
of interesting questions and challenges. We argue that to adequately address these new issues,
26Although we do not consider this in our model, posting bonds with a third party may also help improve
cooperation. For example, if bonds of su¢ cient value are deposited in an escrow fund, tari⁄retaliation is no longer
necessary for sustainting cooperation since the bond posted by the violating country can be used to compensate
the injured country. Such an escrow scheme was in fact proposed by Chile in its bilateral trade agreement
with the US. ￿Chile Looks for Monetary Sanctions as Enforcement Mechanism￿ , INSIDE U.S. TRADE 13,
11/11/2002.
27one needs to go beyond the canonical economic theories of agreements. In this paper, we con-
struct a model that isolates a speci￿c issue that is arguably central to the new global economic
landscape: a coordination externality. Future research should consider the implications of such
an externality for WTO rules and for the process via which trade concessions are exchanged,
e.g. whether to add other instruments to enforce joint punishments and/or adjust the bilateral
reciprocity principle. This externality also highlights the incentive of smaller countries to coor-
dinate on a common external tari⁄via the formation of a customs unions, something that could
potentially generate a novel interaction between preferential and multilateral liberalization.27
Finally, this new trade order seems to be one where bilateral trade shares and patterns are both
dynamic and uncertain, two dimensions that should be better incorporated in future research
on trade agreements.
5 Appendix
Nash tari⁄ for smaller countries
The tari⁄ in (6) is obtained by solving the following ￿rst-order condition for ￿￿k, where all
variables correspond to their import, x.
Wk
￿￿k = 0 : (1 + pw
￿￿k)[￿￿kM￿k















￿￿k we implicitly di⁄erentiate the market clearing condition for x holding all other
tari⁄s constant






































"￿k + (￿ ￿ 1)
S￿k=M￿k
￿￿k
27While some countries have tried to do so (e.g. Mercosur) customs unions are di¢ cult to negotiate and are
thus unlikely to eliminate the need for alternatives such as ￿nancial instruments in the WTO.
28where the last line uses the following de￿nitions of k0s import elasticity, ￿￿k, and inverse foreign

















Relationship between elasticities of individual small countries and regional aggregate
Notice that if all k have the same tari⁄s then the individual country and regional import
demand elasticities are identical
￿￿k = ￿M￿k
p pw=M￿k = ￿(M￿
p=K)pw=(M￿=K) = ￿￿
However, the residual export supply elasticity each individual country faces, "￿k, is di⁄erent








"￿ for K > 1. To see this note that "￿k = "￿at K = 1 and @"￿
@K = 0 when





(￿￿￿K￿￿+K"￿)2 < 0 if K > 1 since ￿￿ < "￿
for the good imported by this region.















Mp + (K ￿ 1)M￿
p=K
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￿M￿ + (K ￿ 1)M￿=K
= ￿
￿
1 + (K ￿ 1)M￿
p=KMp
￿









= K"￿ ￿ (K ￿ 1)￿￿
where the last line uses M￿
p=Mp = ￿￿￿="￿.
Global optimum tari⁄s (eq. (8)): These are obtained by solving the following ￿rst-order
condition for ￿C
W￿(￿C) + W￿￿(￿￿ = ￿C) = 0 : (1 + pw
￿ )[￿CMp + (￿ ￿ 1)S] = 0
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